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Abstrat
As publi key tehnology beomes more widely used, problems with
inompatibility between digital ertiates issued in dierent domains or
by dierent CAs will beome more apparent. In this paper we dene and
desribe the onept of digital ertiate translation, a onept that an
be used to translate ertiates of dierent types. Sine it involves issuing
new ertiates the onept an also be used for other purposes suh as
delegating path validation and entralising trust and poliy management.
After desribing the onept of ertiate translation and some seurity
onerns, we disuss what ertiate translation an be used for and give
two pratial examples where the onept an prove beneial. Finally, we
look at where a protool for ertiate translation an be employed, either
as an extension to existing protools or as a stand-alone protool.
Keywords: digital erti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ertiate translation, PKI
1 Bakground
The deployment and use of Publi Key Infrastrutures (PKIs) to failitate seure
ommuniation has gained widespread popularity during the last few years. This
trend is likely to ontinue for the foreseeable future. Digital ertiates have a
entral role in any PKI. The traditional way to enable ommuniation between
entities in dierent PKIs is to utilise ross ertiation where a Certiation
Authority (CA) issues a ertiate for a CA in another PKI. However, suh
ertiates may not exist or may not be diretly useable for various reasons.
Certiates used in dierent PKI implementations tend to have dierent stru-
tures and dierent information stored in them. This an make ommuniation
between entities of dierent PKIs tedious or even impossible. Although many
PKIs make use of standard formats for ertiates suh as X.509 [8℄, this an still
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reate problems sine, as in the ase of X.509, the standard supports extension
elds that are not dened within the standard.
Wireless data ommuniation is expeted to take o within the next ouple
of years as a development of today's mobile phone systems, putting new require-
ments on existing networks, servies, and protools. Muh eort is urrently
being put into standardising protools to be used in this wireless environment.
WTLS, the seurity protool speied for WAP [9℄, has been speied to make
use of digital ertiates and it is assumed that digital ertiates will also be
used by other protools in this new environment.
2 General onept
By eletronially signing a publi key along with an entity identier and possibly
various other attributes a ertiation authority provides assurane regarding the
relationship between the publi key and the inluded attributes. If any of these
attributes are hanged a new CA signature must be applied to the ertiate.
In ertain irumstanes, suh as where a ertiate arries an inompatible
ertiate eld or is of an inompatible type from that whih the end user under-
stands, it would be useful to make hanges to existing ertiates. Suh hanges
an be ahieved using ertiate translation, a onept that forms the main fous
of this paper. We now dene the terms underlying this translation onept. A
translated ertiate is a ertiate to whih hanges has been made sine it was
originally issued. Changes to a ertiate's ontent as well as to its format (e.g.
struture, oding) may have been made. The value of the publi key is the only
ertiate eld that may not be altered. A ertiate translation servie is able
to aept a ertiate and reate a new (translated) ertiate with a modied
struture and/or ontent. A ertiate translation server (CTS) is a server that
oers a ertiate translation servie to lients. A ertiate translation server
would have to be trusted by its lients, the entities using the servie, just like
any traditional CA has to be trusted by its users.
If the CA who signed the original ertiate is `aessible' (and willing) it an
issue a new ertiate inluding the publi key of the original ertiate and any
other attributes that apply. On other oasions the CA who issued the original
ertiate will not be available or able to issue a ertain ertiate. On suh
oasions a CA ating as a CTS, who is able to verify the original ertiate,
ould issue a new ertiate inluding the publi key from the original ertiate.
Another appliation of ertiate translation is to translate a hain of erti-
ates into a single ertiate. This an in partiular be useful in environments
where CPU, memory, or bandwidth resoures are onstrained, and an also be
used to entralise trust and poliy management in an organisation.
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3 Seurity onsiderations
3.1 Certiate ontent assurane
A ertiate translation servie will in pratie at as a CA. A CA usually takes
ertain measures to ensure that the information it puts into a ertiate is orret.
This typially inludes measures to ensure that a laimed identity atually belongs
to the laimant and that an entity that supplies a publi key to be inluded in
a ertiate is also in possession of the orresponding private key. The eort
a CA puts into ensuring the orretness of this information is usually dened
either impliitly or expliitly in a ertiate pratie statement. A ertiate
translation servie would have to rely on measures taken by other CAs for the
purposes of verifying identity and validating publi keys. The signature of the
ertiate that is to be translated, as well as any intermediate ertiates required
to form a ertiate hain to a trusted root, have to be validated. A ertiate
translation servie would have to publish its own ertiate pratie statement
speifying under what irumstanes a translated ertiate will be produed.
3.2 Revoation
By translating a ertiate the translator is in pratie issuing a new ertiate
and therefore ating as a CA. If the original ertiate is revoked the translated
ertiate should also be revoked. In ertain environments and appliations this
problem an be takled through giving translated ertiates a minimal validity
period. Where this is not possible, revoation must be dealt with in a proper
way, just as in any other PKI.
If lients are going to be able to validate the status of the original ertiate
even when only in possession of the translated version, enough information must
be provided in the translated ertiate (or along with it) to validate it against
ertiate revoation lists, or any other means used to advertise revoations for
ertiates issued by the original CA. In the ase where X.509 v3 [8℄ is used in
the translated ertiate and the original ertiate is X.509 v1, v2, or v3 the
issuer name and ertiate serial number an be stored in an extension of the
translated ertiate in order to allow traeability of the original ertiate.
3.3 Liability
A ertiation authority may plae limitations on the use of its ertiates, in
order to ontrol the risk that it assumes as a result of issuing ertiates. For
instane, it may restrit the ommunity of ertiate users, the purpose for whih
they may use its ertiates and/or the type and extent of damages that it is
prepared to make good in the event of a failure on its part, or that of its end-
entities. These matters an be dened in a ertiate poliy.
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It is most likely that by translating a ertiate any liabilities undertaken
by the original CA will no longer apply. For ertain appliations, or where the
ertiate poliy refers to the publi key rather than to the ertiate as suh,
liabilities undertaken by the CA originally issuing a ertiate might still apply.
If the translating servie is prepared to do so, it an issue translated ertiates
under similar poliies as the original ertiate was issued; otherwise it an issue
the ertiate using a more appropriate poliy for the situation.
4 Appliations for ertiate translation
4.1 Translating between inompatible ertiate types
Many types of ertiates exist today. A few examples are: X.509 [8℄, X9.68,
OpenPGP ertiates [2℄, SPKI ertiates [3℄, EMV ertiates [4℄, and WTLS
ertiates [10℄. Appliations designed to use one type of ertiate usually do
not work very well with a dierent type of ertiate. In some ases ertiates
are very appliation oriented and using a dierent type of ertiate does not
make any sense. For other appliations dierent types of ertiates are used
for the same purpose, possibly in dierent domains. Under suh irumstanes
translation of ertiates from one format into another would allow entities using
dierent types of ertiates to ommuniate using the advantages of publi-key
ryptography and digital ertiates.
4.2 Translating inompatible ertiate elds
Although many PKIs make use of standard formats for ertiates suh as X.509
[8℄, this an still reate problems sine, as in the ase of X.509, the standard
supports extension elds that are not dened within the standard. Two dierent
CAs an be issuing ertiates arrying extensions with the same purpose but
with dierent names. It is also possible that dierent CAs are issuing ertiates
arrying extensions with the same name and syntax but with dierent purposes.
4.3 Delegating path validation
If a lient does not have suient proessing or networking resoures to perform
path validation for eah ertiate it reeives, path validation an be delegated
to a ertiate translation server. The CTS validates the ertiate hain and
issues a new ertiate arrying the publi key of the last ertiate in the hain.
4.4 Centralised trust and poliy management
For organisations requiring a entrally imposed poliy and management funtion,
it is unaeptable to allow a lient to manage its own set of trusted roots, or the
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poliies that it aepts during path validation. A ertiate translation server
an enfore poliy deisions while performing path validation. After validating
a ertiate hain the ertiate translation server an, if appropriate, issue a
translated version of the last ertiate in the hain, at the same time imposing
restritions regulated through its poliy.
5 Senarios
5.1 WAP
5.1.1 Need for ertiate translation in WAP
WAP (Wireless Appliation Protool) [9℄ is onsidered here as a possible appli-
ation for whih ertiate translation ould prove to be of advantage.
In WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Seurity), the seurity protool designed
for WAP, ertiates are used for server authentiation as well as for lient au-
thentiation when so requested. Digital ertiates an also be used in WAP
for key agreement [10℄. The WAP speiation speies three supported formats
of ertiates and allows additional ertiate types to be added in the future.
The urrently speied ertiate types are X.509v3 [8℄, X9.68, and a WTLS
ertiate whih is a ertiate optimised for size.
WAP is intended to be used in a wireless environment using handheld devies
with limited storage, proessing resoures and transmission bandwidth. Seurity
parameters are negotiated during the WTLS handshake. This negotiation may
also require transmission of ertiates between server and lient and vie versa.
When ertiates are known in advane no ertiates need to be transmitted
between the two parties. When a ertiate is transmitted the sender indiates
the type of ertiate that it supplies. However, there is no way for the reeiving
party to indiate whih type of ertiate it prefers or understands. It must be
assumed that in order to be ompatible with this version of WTLS an implemen-
tation must ope with the three speied ertiate types. A ertiate hain
an be transmitted along with a ertiate. In a ertiate hain, all ertiates
must use algorithms appropriate for the negotiated key exhange suite. E.g. if
RSA has been seleted all ertiates must arry RSA keys signed with RSA.
5.1.2 Certiate translation in WAP
Certiate translation ould be used in WAP in order to minimise the proess-
ing and storage requirements of ertiates as well as to provide ompatibility
with other types of ertiates besides those dened within the urrent WTLS
speiation.
When a WAP lient reeives a ertiate with an unknown type it an simply
forward it to a server that oers a ertiate translation servie. The erti-
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ate translation server interprets the ertiate, validates it, and rewrites it in a
format that the lient has requested, putting its own signature on it. However,
WAP is designed to be used in an environment where large time delays exist,
and it is possible that a onnetion would time out during the time it takes for
the WAP lient to establish a session with a server that oers the translation
servie and has the ertiate translated. This should not however lead to any
serious ompliations. The lient an initiate a new WTLS session and during
this handshake indiate that it already has the server ertiate. The orrespond-
ing senario where a WAP server does not understand the lient ertiate type
would work in the same manner.
Certiate translation ould also be used to redue the load on a handheld
devie with limited CPU resoures. Every ertiate that needs to be veried
requires some omputing resoures. Given that a ertiate hain an ontain
quite a few ertiates and that the proessing power on some handheld devies
will be very limited it may be desirable to let a CTS do the omputations required.
By doing this, resoure requirements will be shifted from CPU resoures (on the
handheld devie) to bandwidth requirements, assuming that CPU resoures at the
CTS is not a problem. The CTS would, after reeiving a ertiate hain, verify
the ertiates and if it leads to a trusted root ertiate reate a new ertiate.
This new ertiate would, aording to our denition, be a translation of the
last ertiate in the hain. After reeiving the translated ertiate the user
ould store the translated ertiate for future use, if appliable.
5.2 MExE
5.2.1 Need for ertiate translation in MExE
MExE is onsidered here as another appliation where a ertiate translation
servie ould be advantageous.
MExE (Mobile Station Appliation Exeution Environment), speied by
3GPP, provides a standardised exeution environment for mobile stations (typi-
ally a mobile phone with a smart ard). MExE speies three seurity domains
[1℄:
- MExE seurity operator domain (MExE exeutables authorised by the
HPLMN (Home Publi Land Mobile Network) operator, i.e the operator
to whose network the user has a subsription).
- MExE seurity manufaturer domain (MExE exeutables authorised by the
terminal manufaturer).
- MExE seurity third party domain (trusted MExE exeutables authorised
by trusted third parties).
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Untrusted MExE exeutables are not in a spei domain, and have very
redued privileges. For eah domain a root publi key is installed in the MS
(mobile station). In order for an exeutable to run it has to arry a signature
that an be validated using root publi keys and digital ertiates (ertiate
hains are supported). An optional mehanism, involving storing a hash of the
exeutable along with its expiry date/time in a proteted veried appliation list,
is dened to avoid omplete signature veriation eah time an exeutable is run.
The MExE speiation [1℄ mentions WTLS ertiates and X.509 ertiates
but does not rule out other types of ertiates.
5.2.2 Certiate translation in MExE
Just as for WAP, ertiate translation an be used in MExE in order to min-
imise the proessing and storage requirements of ertiates as well as to provide
ompatibility with various types of ertiates.
Sine no ertiate type is mandated for MExE it is possible that problems
with inompatible ertiate types will arise. Certiate translation an, in a
very similar way as desribed for WAP, be used to overome suh obstales.
The problem with reurrent signature validation of previously exeuted ode
has been taken are of through the veried appliation list as mentioned above.
However, in ases where several applets are downloaded and exeuted from the
same site they are likely to share the same ertiate hain. A translated er-
tiate an be used to shorten suh a ertiate hain in order to preserve CPU
and memory resoures. It is likely that an MS aware of multiple instanes of
signed ode from the same site ould do suh a veriation even more eiently
in terms of CPU resoures. A ertiate translation approah however ould be
more general and would not require the terminal to store any intermediate states
or results and therefore would require less memory resoures.
6 Extension to SCVP
The Simple Certiate Validation Protool (SCVP) is urrently an IETF draft
[5℄. The protool allows a lient to ooad ertiate handling to a server. The
server an give a variety of information about a ertiate, suh as whether or not
a ertiate is valid, a hain to a trusted ertiate, and so on. SCVP has many
purposes, inluding simplifying lient implementations and allowing ompanies
to entralise their trust and poliy management.
SCVP allows a lient to request the status of a ertiate. This requires
appliations using the SCVP servie to be aware of the protool. Appliations
designed before SCVP is nalised, or whih for some other reason do not support
SCVP, will not easily be able to make use of the SCVP protool. If a ertiate
translation server were used instead, standalone software able to ommuniate
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with a CTS would be able to interat with existing software without any hanges
to the ertiate using software. The ertiate using software would have to load
the CTS ertiate as a trusted root CA ertiate and ertiates signed by the
CTS would be valid. Suh a solution would allow a ompany to entralise their
trust and poliy management, requiring minimal hanges to existing systems.
Another advantage with a ertiate translation solution over the urrent
SCVP protool is that only a ertiate would need to be stored by the lient, as
opposed to SCVP where a ertiate and assoiated status information need to
be stored by the lient if required for future use.
Sine many features of SCVP are required or useful in a ertiate translation
servie, ertiate translation ould be implemented as an extension to, or in
ombination with, SCVP.
7 Outline of a ertiate translation protool
7.1 Protool overview
In this setion we will outline a protool for ertiate translation. The protool
desribed is a standalone protool in order to show how ertiate translation an
be implemented. As desribed in setion 6 the protool ould be inorporated into
another protool. However, for environments with restrited bandwidth, having a
dediated protool for the purpose is likely to redue unneessary ommuniation
overhead.
This protool uses a simple request response model. That is, a lient reates
a single request and sends it to the server; the server reates a single response
and sends it to the lient. The lient is assumed to be in possession of the CTS'
digital ertiate prior to the protool taking plae.
Certiate translation is expeted to be of partiular importane in environ-
ments, suh as wireless, with limited bandwidth and where lients have restrited
proessing and memory resoures. Hene, in order to keep the data sent over
the ommuniation path to a minimum, the CTS an keep a database of its
lients and their preferenes. This will minimise the information that is sent in
every translation request. The server an, for example, store the preferred er-
tiate type, lient ertiate, and possibly ertain ertiate eld information
that might be spei to a lient.
7.2 Request
A translation request is made up of the following information, of whih some will
not always be required:
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- Client identiation
- Original ertiate (ertiate to be translated)
- Original ertiate type
- New ertiate type
- New ertiate ontent
- Certiates for path validation
- Client ertiate
- Client signature
We now onsider eah of these information types in a little more detail.
7.2.1 Client identiation
Client identiation is used to identify the lient requesting translation. Identi-
ation an be used for things suh as aounting, loating the lient's ertiate
(if not supplied in the request), or to nd lient's preferenes in a database if
suh a database exists. In environments where this information is not required,
suh as in a proteted private network where the translation servie is available
to all onneted users, and there is no need for the server to keep a user database
of any kind, this information may well be omitted.
7.2.2 Original ertiate
This is the ertiate for whih translation is requested. The omplete ertiate
or a ertiate identier must be supplied as part of a ertiate translation
request.
7.2.3 Original ertiate type
If known by lient, the type of the ertiate that is submitted for translation is
indiated here. Sine one purpose of the protool is to enable lients not aware
of a ertain type of ertiate to have ertiates of that type translated into
a known type, it must be assumed that the lient is not always aware of the
type of the ertiate that is submitted for translation. The translation server
should therefore be able to analyse the supplied ertiate and make qualied
onlusions regarding the supplied ertiate type. In many environments where
the translation servie will be used for the purpose of translating from ertiate
types unknown to the lient, the translation server an be ongured to know
whih types of ertiates its lients are aware of, not aware of, and likely to
be requesting translation for. The ertiate type eld is also, when appliable,
used to indiate ertiate enoding, suh as BER [6℄ or PER [7℄, if known by
the lient.
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7.2.4 New ertiate type
This eld indiates the type of ertiate, and enoding if appliable, that the
lient expets to reeive bak from the translation server.
7.2.5 New ertiate ontent
This part allows the lient to desribe any spei information that needs to be
inluded in the new ertiate. The lient an inlude the ontent of any elds
it wishes to have inluded or may only indiate whih elds are to be inluded
in the new ertiate and let the translation server get the information from the
translated ertiate. Another approah would be for the lient to indiate the
intended usage for the new ertiate. The detailed speiation of this partiular
setion requires further researh to allow enough exibility without requiring too
muh overhead.
7.2.6 Certiates for path veriation
Many protools utilising digital ertiates let the ommuniating parties inlude
a ertiate hain when exhanging ertiates in order for the other party to
verify the ertiation path. If the lient reeives suh a ertiate hain it an
forward it to the translation server.
7.2.7 Client ertiate
When the server is not expeted to already be in possession of the requesting
lient's publi key or is not able to retrieve it by other means, the lient should
also supply its digital ertiate in the request in order to enable the server to
validate the signature (see setion 7.2.8).
7.2.8 Client signature
When the translation servie need to be restrited to pre-registered lients only,
when the servie is being harged for, or when lients need to be held aountable
for their translation requests for other reasons, the lient signs the omplete
request.
7.3 Response
The ertiate translation response is sent bak to the lient in response to its
request. If the requested ertiate translation failed the server returns an error
ode indiating why the request was not fullled. If the request was proessed su-
essfully a new translated ertiate is returned to the lient. Sine the ertiate
will arry the translation server's signature, no further message authentiation
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will be required in many ases. However, on oasions when the lient who re-
quested the translation will not be the end user, it is possible that the lient will
not be able to verify the ertiate signature, and another signature would be
required in the response to ensure that the message originates from the ertiate
translation server and has not been tampered with.
8 Conlusions
We have desribed the onept of ertiate translation and how it an be used for
dierent purposes. Not only an the onept prove useful to onvert ertiates
of dierent types but it an also be partiularly useful in wireless environments
in order to preserve bandwidth, memory, and CPU resoures. A protool for
ertiate translation an be implemented as a standalone protool or as an
extension to, or in ombination with, existing adjaent protools. SCVP is a good
andidate of an existing protool that an be extended to inorporate ertiate
translation. In other environments a standalone protool is more suitable to keep
ommuniations overhead to a minimum.
Future work will inlude development of a detailed protool for the ertiate
translation servie, based on a detailed analysis of requirements emerging from
the requirements of mobile ommuniations.
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